Peach @ PH-Neutral 0x7d8

•May 25, 2008 • Leave a Comment

The past ph-neutral security conferences in IMG_0242Berlin I have attended were all very fun, laid back, and informative.  The European security “underground” scene is highly refreshing after so many high cost US conferences.  Additionally the people are excellent and provide for good conversations.  This years ph-neutral was no exception and was held at an Island club, providing more space for this ever growing conference.  This year was packed as usual with a record high of 450 pre-registrations.

I originally wrote Peach 1 at ph-neutral 4 or 5 years ago, so it seemed fitting to come back and talk about Peach 2.  I had a blast and look forward to next year.

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.NET “unsafe” Security Issues — Part 1

•May 22, 2008 • Leave a Comment

The Microsoft .NET Framework provides the developer with a number of advanced features such as P/Invoke and unsafe code blocks.  This article will take a look at unsafe code blocks and some of the security issues that should be looked for when reviewing or writing such code.

 

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First off, what is the unsafe keyword and how can it be used?  Glad you asked, unsafe allows for the use of pointers in .NET code.  This includes pointers to managed objects such as arrays and strings.  To use the unsafe keyword the assembly or executable must be compiled with a special flag allowing for unsafe code blocks.  The resulting assembly/executable will not be verifiable by the CLR.

Modification of Immutable Types

With power comes the temptation to modify immutable types such as strings.  Resist this urge as the CLR does a number of internal optimizations for known immutable types like strings.  Modification of these immutable types can and will cause instability in the CLR, and have interesting ramifications.  For example, some versions of the CLR keep only a single copy of strings.  So if I created three strings, all with the value “Hello World”, I would really only have three references to the same string.  This is okay since the string object is immutable.  However, if I take a pointer to the string and change its contents I will end up changing the contents of all three strings!!

Managed Pointers and Pinning

The .NET memory manager can move values and object instances around in memory as needed.  So, if we are going to get a pointer to such a memory region we need to tell the memory manager not to move that memory on us.  Enter object pinning.  Pinning tells the CLR not to move something until it is unpinned.  A typical bug in unsafe code is when a managed pointer is held on to and used after it’s reference has been unpinned.  This is a hard bug to detect as the program may run fine most of time and the crashes that occur may not be obviously linked to the unsafe code.

In the C# managed language, pinning typically occurs using the “fixed” block.  This makes it easier to spot issues.  I recommend avoiding other methods of pinning variables as they can be harder to review.

The managed extensions to C++ also provide what feels like “lower level” control over variable pinning.  This is typically harder to review, but then if you are writing in MC++ you should already know what your about :)

Buffer Overflows and other Pointer Issues

With the unsafe keyword and pointer math come all the standard security issues those C/C++ developers need to worry about.  There is a real possibility of causing buffer overflows that result in exploitable conditions in .NET applications.  Buffer manipulation should be reviewed just like C/C++ for possible overflows.

 

And so ends part 1 of this article.  Please feel free to comment on this post with questions and comments.

OWASP AppSec 08 Belgium

•May 22, 2008 • 1 Comment


belgiumI’m currently running around Europe dropping in on a few security conferences.  Wednesday and Thursday have me in Ghent, Belgium at the OWASP AppSec 08 conference.  I’ll be jumping onstage Thursday morning to talk about two of my OWASP projects (see below).

First time in Belgium, and I must say the Cherry Lambic is nice and it feels like a slower pace then the Netherlands with similar architecture.

OWASP AppSec 08 Belgium

 

OWASP Encoding Project (Reform)

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Preventing XSS with Correct Output Encoding

•May 19, 2008 • 4 Comments

 

Encoding output to prevent cross site scripting (XSS) is old news to most in the web security community, but it’s still an area that is done incorrectly, or with out thought to future issues that might arise.  Additionally, with the explosion of AJAX based applications there is a lack of encoding tools that target JavaScript or provide an implementation for JavaScript.

 

Standard framework utilities for encoding output (Server.HtmlEncode, etc) only encode the most basic set of characters needed, &, <, >, and “.  In a perfect world this would be enough, but in the day and age of browser bugs, broken Unicode libraries, and lenient HTML interpretation that can lead to occasional sloppy coding more is needed to protect our applications.  Enter the Reform encoding library.

Of specific mention is correct context aware output encoding.  The context could be “html body”, “html attribute”, “css”, “javascript”, etc.  It’s important to understand how your data will get treated to know how it needs to be encoded.  It’s because of context issues that one must encode on output of data instead of input.  Unfortunately there are no shortcuts :)

The Refrom encoding library, also known as the OWASP Encoding Project, provides conservative functions for performing different types of encoding’s that are needed in today’s web applications in a large variety of languages.  Currently there is support for: Java, C, Python, Perl, PHP, Ruby, JavaScript, ASP.NET, and Classic ASP.  All of the Reform functions are internationalization safe, are easy to use, and prevent all known types of XSS issues when used correctly.

What is encoded?

  • Everything but: A-Z, a-z, 0-9, space [ ], comma [,], and period [.]
  • Unicode is always encoded

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The following functions are provided:

  • HtmlEncode — Encode data for display in a block of HTML or HTML attribute.
  • JsEncode — Encode data into a JavaScript literal
  • VbsEncode — Encode data into a VBScript string literal

Microsoft’s AntiXss Library

An alternative to Reform is the Microsoft AntiXss Library.  Both libraries are functionally equivalent and in fact were designed by the same people.

Reform can be downloaded from here.

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Peach 2.1 BETA2.A

•May 19, 2008 • Leave a Comment

Silly bug got into the 2.1 release that caused the <Number> type to stop working (oops!), fixed and a new release pushed up.

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Peach 2.1 BETA2 Released

•May 14, 2008 • Leave a Comment

The latest in the Peach 2 series has been posted.  This release includes many bug fixes, features, improvements, and supercedes 2.0 as the recommended version to use.

    • Unittests to improve stability and reliability
    • Improved COM support including properties
    • Improved state machine
    • Fuzz network clients easily by listening for connections, not just creating them
    • Remote publishers allow sending data through a Peach Agent to a remote host
    • Improved Linux and OS X support via debugger.UnixGdb monitor (uses beta pygdb module)
    • Deterministic fuzzing will perform test count calculation in separate thread to speed fuzzing
    • Improved documentation.  See the Peach 2 Tutorial which is quickly becoming the Peach 2 Guide :)

     

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    Peach 2.1 BETA1 Released!

    •January 25, 2008 • Leave a Comment

    I’m just about to jet up to CanSecWest, and though I would toss up a beta of Peach 2.1.  Peach 2.1 includes a new state machine which allows modeling the state of a protocol at a high level.  This makes complex fuzzer creation much easier.  Additionally, call based fuzzers such as COM are much easier to fuzz.

    PS- If your up at CanSecWest be sure to check out my talk on Peach Friday morning.

    Head here to download.


    ASP.NET 2.0 dumb's down request validation

    •January 23, 2008 • 10 Comments

    Since the early days of ASP.NET there has been a heavy reliance on the request validation performed to mitigate cross-site scripting issues as many of the WebControls do not perform any encoding.  In ASP.NET v1.1 the request validation performed was fairly restrictive.  It looked for tags, expressions, on strings (onClick, etc), javascript:, and "&#".  After reviewing an ASP.NET 2.0 site I found these protections have been simplified to just look for tags and "&#".

    This has a number of interesting security impacts as any 1.1 site which relies on these protections as mitigation’s to security issues will find themselves vulnerable once they upgrade.  It would be interesting to know Microsoft’s reasons for removing these checks.  I would assume it caused to many customer issues, perhaps interfered with AJAX in some way.

    To recap, asp.net v1.1 performed the following checks:

    1. Look for "&#"
    2. Look for ‘<’ then alphas or ! or / (tags)
    3. Look for "script:"
    4. Look for on handlers (onXXX=)
    5. Look for “expression(“
    6. Skip elements named "__VIEWSTATE"

    While asp.net v2.0 and higher performs the following:

    1. Look for &#
    2. Look for ‘<’ then alphas or ! or / (tags)
    3. Skip elements with names prefixed with double underscore (__)

    As you can see the 2.0 version is much weaker than 1.1.

    Enjoy!

    .NET Bestfit Unicode Conversion for P/Invoke

    •January 21, 2008 • 5 Comments

    When performing a standard p/invoke method call in which a .NET string must be converted to an unmanaged LPSTR (char*), the .NET runtime performs a “bestfit” conversion.  This means some Unicode characters will be converted down to ASCII characters based on some mapping information.  This “bestfit” conversion can allow an attacker to bypass input validation filters.  For example, a filename might be checked to make sure it does not contain a backslash (“\”) character, or two periods (“..”).  By using Unicode characters an attacker could by pass those checks by providing a Unicode character that will be converted to the required ASCII character during the marshaling of the string.

    Full article with character map.

    Peach 2 Training

    •January 20, 2008 • Leave a Comment

    A two day training course in Peach 2 is being offered this year at BlackHat Vegas.  This course will cover all of the latest Peach 2 features in a hands on, lab intensive manor.  Including the Peach 2 features being released later this year.

    The course will cover creating fuzzers for the following situations:

    • State-aware network protocol parsers
    • N-tier applications
    • Arbitrary APIs
    • File parsers
    • COM and Active/X components
    • Detect non-classic faults in software
    • Extend the Peach Fuzzing Platform by creating custom Transformers, Generators, Publishers, and Monitors.
    • Apply these concepts and tools to their unique environment
    • Utilize parallel fuzzing to increase fuzzing efficiency

    Course information and registration.

     
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